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Abstract: Our analysis of a rich representative household survey for Malawi, where patrilineal 
and matrilineal institutions coexist, suggests that (a) in matrilineal societies the likelihood of 
high value crop cultivation by a household increases with the extent of land owned by males, 
while the income generated from high value crop production decreases with the amount of land 
owned by females (b) cultivation of high value crops increases household welfare. The policy 
implication is that facilitating female ownership of assets through informal and formal 
institutions does not, on its own, increase welfare when appropriate complementary resources 
and institutions are absent. (98 words) 
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  Is women's ownership of land a panacea in developing countries? 
Evidence from land-owning farm households in Malawi 
1. Introduction 
The pursuit of poverty reduction in developing countries has generally been associated 
with attempts to increase the capabilities and endowments of people through a variety of 
measures, such as investment in education and facilitation of asset ownership. In particular, 
there has been an emphasis on land ownership, land being the main form of asset that is 
expected to provide both economic security and social prestige in these countries. In a related 
discussion it has been argued that movement out of subsistence farming into commercial (or 
high value (HV) crop) production is a promising way out of poverty and establishing secure 
property rights of land is an important ingredient to this successful transition1. Over the years, 
a gender dimension has been added to these policy initiatives. It is now argued that these 
policies should, in particular, facilitate development of capability and asset ownership among 
women.  
Even as these policies are pursued in developing countries, it is well understood that 
there is widespread entitlement failure, making it difficult, in some cases impossible, to 
translate capabilities and asset ownership into (higher) earnings. A specific example of such 
entitlement failure, loosely speaking, is the inability of households to participate in the 
production of high value crops that can increase their income and hence their welfare. This 
form of entitlement failure is particularly acute among women, often on account of insecurity 
of property rights (Besley, 1995). In many contexts, often due to entrenched informal 
LQVWLWXWLRQVZRPHQ¶VODQGULJKWVDUHQRWDWSDUZLWKWKRVHRIPHQ$JDUZDO6RPHWLPHV
women simply have no customary rights on land (Agarwal, 1988). In other cases they do, but 
the laws that underpin the property rights RIZRPHQPD\EH³GLIILFXOWWRHQIRUFHEHFDXVHWKH\
JRDJDLQVWWKHJUDLQRIFXOWXUDOSUDFWLFH´-RLUHPDQSS3URSHUW\ULJKWVFDQDOVR
be weakened by other economic, social, cultural and ideological factors (Agarwal, 1994; Arun, 
1999). They, iQ WXUQFDQDGYHUVHO\ DIIHFWZRPHQ¶VDEility to collaterize their land or other 
assets to gain access to capital and other resources that are important for the translation of asset 
ownership into income generating output. 
Hence, even though participation in HV crop production is viewed as a means to 
empowering smallholders in general, and female smallholders in particular (Dolan and Sorby, 
2003), and despite theoretical propositions and empirical evidence suggesting that enhanced 
asset ownership by women may be welfare enhancing (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003; Duflo 
and Udry, 2004; Doss, 2006; Luke and Munsi, 2011), it is by no means certain that female 
ownership of land per se would improve the welfare of the household. Specifically, female 
ownership of land, even when it is institutionalised, may not lead to the transition from 
subsistence to commercial or HV agriculture that is perceived to be welfare enhancing. In 
Gambia for instance, women used to be traditional rice growers and were given formal land 
titles. It was assumed that the introduction of better technology for rice in the form of pump 
irrigation would have a productivity enhancing effect on women. However, faced with 
constraints on access to credit and hired labour, women failed to adopt the new technology and 
remained traditional rice producers. By contrast, male allocation to the irrigated rice sector 
increased. This contributed to the increase in annual per capita income and food consumption, 
but on account of male allocation to the sector. Female economic empowerment played no role 
in it (von Braun, Puetz and Webb, 1989).  
We contribute to the literature by examining the impact of land ownership on 
participation in high value agriculture, and by focusing on the gender differences of this impact. 
The context of our study is Malawi, where high value crops, such as tobacco and groundnuts 
have historically been considered welfare enhancing, and whose rural landscape is 
characterised by patrilineal and matrilineal land tenure systems. Matrilineal kinship places user 
and control rights over land in the hands of women.2 However, even as these social institutions 
of kinship gives women a degree of economic security not found in patrilineal systems, de facto 
their rights over land come with some uncertainties. Specifically, parents in matrilineal 
societies sometimes choose to break with tradition and pass the lands on to the male children, 
while PDWHUQDOXQFOHVFDQFRQWHVWZRPHQ¶VRZQHUVKLSRIODQG:RUOG%DQN:2/5(&
2011). Furthermore, men have significantly greater control over positions of power such as that 
of the village chief and female access to complementary resources such as credit, fertilizers 
and extension services is restricted (Peters, 2010; Nkonjera, 2011). We hypothesise that on 
account of both the growing uncertainty over land rights that reduces willingness to invest in 
cash crops (World Bank, 1991; Green and Baden, 1994), and limited access to complementary 
UHVRXUFHV1NRQMHUDZRPHQ¶VRZQHUVKLSRIODQGPD\EHQHJDWLYHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKH
adoption of high value agriculture. The empirical results, while consistent with this logic, hold 
interesting nuances with respect to the particular type of interaction of de jure and de facto 
rights of male and female land ownership.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we outline the empirical 
methodology. The data are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we report and discuss the 
regression results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical methodology 
2.1. Econometric model 
Heuristically, we model household welfare as being dependent on the exposure to high 
value crops, when the exposure to high value crops themselves are determined by the 
interaction between de jure and de facto ownership of land between men and women in the 
households3. In other words, we estimate the following system of equations:  
CCCC HVXC HGE  ,         [1] 
HVHVHVZHV PT  *          (2) 
In equation [1] C is our welfare measure for the ith household, CX are a set of j variables, 
CE  is the associated  vector of coefficients, and CG captures the effect of exposure to high value 
agriculture on household welfare. The residual CH is assumed to follow normal distribution
),0(~ 2VH NC .  We model household welfare as a function of the exposure to HV crops. In 
equation [2] *HV is a latent variable measuring the likelihood of the household to be in the 
high value sector, HVZ is a vector of explanatory variables, HVT is the associated vector of 
coefficient estimates and HVP is the error term. The latent variable *HV is unobserved, but we 
observe HV =1 when 0* !HV  and 0 HV otherwise. Under the assumption that HVP follows 
a normal distribution such that )1,0(~ NHVP , the corresponding specification is a probit 
model. Hence, )()1Pr( TTZHV T)  and )()0Pr( TTZT T)  , where (.)) is a normal 
distribution function.  
 Note that our estimation strategy does not involve separate estimations of equations [1] 
and [2] to help address an important econometric issue. If equation [1] were to be estimated on 
its own with the use of ordinary least squares (OLS), treating HV as an exogenous variable 
would be erroneous. Households are unlikely to be randomly selected into the production of 
higher value crops, i.e. 0)|( zHVE CH . If households with genuinely higher or genuinely 
lower welfare are self-selected into the production of higher value crops, the OLS estimates of 
welfare are likely to be biased. Assuming  that ),( HVC PH follow a joint normal distribution of 
the form ),1,,0,0(~),(
,
2
HVCHVC N UVPH H , where HVC,U is the coefficient of correlation, we 
therefore estimate a treatment effect model of household welfare, which accounts for the 
possibility of non-random selection of household into the high value market (Barnow et al, 
1981). Specifically: 
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where (.)I is the normal density function. Hence, the difference in per adult equivalent 
expenditures between households self-selected into the high value agricultural sector and those 
not self-selected into the high value agricultural sector is: 
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HVHVHVHV
HVHV
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Z
HVCEHVCE TT
TIVUG H ))               (5) 
We estimate equation (5) using a full maximum likelihood method and obtain unbiased 
estimates of CC GE , and HVT , henceforth referred to as the treatreg model. Note that the term in 
the brackets is the Mills ratio, which depends on the value of the High Value sector 
participation variable. A positive value of this selectivity term provides evidence in favor of 
underestimated levels of per adult equivalent expenditures on account of selection of 
individuals with genuinely higher living standards into the High Value agricultural sector, and 
vice versa in the case of a negative selectivity term. The correct effect of the HV variable on 
per adult equivalent expenditures has to be computed net of the selectivity bias.  
 One of the attractive features of the treatreg model is its flexibility with respect to 
identification, given that the normality in the probit model serves as an excluded condition. As 
D UHVXOW ³WKH ; Dnd Z variables in the treatment and outcome equations can be the same 
variables, if the user suspects that covariates of selection can also be covariates of the outcome 
regression. Similarly, X and Z can be different variables if the user suspects that covariates of 
VHOHFWLRQDUHGLIIHUHQWIURPFRYDULDWHVRIWKHRXWFRPHUHJUHVVLRQ´*XRDQG)UD]HU,Q
our empirical analysis, we experimented with both a just identified model and alternative 
specifications, in particular one that includes an exogenous excluded variable only in the 
decision equation), but the results (available upon request) remained robust to different 
specifications. 
2.2. Empirical specification  
In keeping with the literature, in our baseline specification for equation [1] we proxy 
welfare with the log of household level per adult equivalent expenditures and include in the 
specification variables such as age, gender and education of the household head and  
demographic composition of the household (Glewwe and Hall, 1998; Adams, 2004, 2006; 
Bhaumik, Gang and Yun, 2006; Dimova and Wolff, 2008). As robustness checks, we re-
estimate our model with the use of standard poverty measures, such as poverty incidence, 
poverty depth and poverty severity. Due to space limitations, these results- which are 
qualitatively similar to those in the baseline regression- are available upon request. We 
considered further proxies of welfare, such as anthropometric child characteristics, but this 
reduced our sample by almost 50%.  
As mentioned earlier, the main focus of this paper is the impact of de jure and de facto 
ownership of land by gender on HV crop production, i.e. on equation [2]. As indicated in 
Section 2.1., our HV variable takes the value of one if the household is involved in the 
production of HV crops. Given the nature of agricultural production in Malawi, the higher 
value category includes tobacco and groundnut production4. We experimented with cash crop 
production variable that also includes hybrid maize, the production of which has been 
encouraged by the government over the past few decades as part of both its agricultural 
commercialisation and food security projects. The results across different definitions of cash 
crop-cum-high value crops do not differ significantly and due to space limitations we only 
report those based on tobacco and groundnuts. 
  We argue that not only per adult equivalent consumption, but also  the probability of 
the household to undertake HV crop production depend on factors such as the age, gender, 
marital status and education level of the household head, as well as household dependency 
ratios. Specifically, education and age/experience are among the primary determinants of 
employability and earnings and are therefore positively associated with per adult equivalent 
H[SHQGLWXUHVERWKGLUHFWO\DQGE\HQKDQFLQJ WKHKRXVHKROG¶VHQWU\ LQWR+9DJULFXOWXUH%\
contrast, female headship and higher dependency ratio are assumed to have negative 
implications for household welfare both directly and via HV agriculture. We also introduce 
controls for whether the household head is involved in a monogamous or a polygamous 
relationship, where being single is the omitted category5.  
We argue that ownership patterns may affect the decision to produce HV crops without 
directly affecting household consumption. Hence, we include only in the decision-making 
equation a number of variables that together capture the influence of ownership patterns of land 
on the decision to produce HV crops. Since these variables are not included in the second stage 
welfare equation, from an econometric point of view, they provide additional excluded 
variables over and above the normality of the probit model. Based on the literature and our 
understanding of the Malawi context, we are fairly certain that land ownership is exogenous in 
the decision equation. User rights over land are well established and driven by custom, with 
rights of transfer limited. Virtually no land market exists and transfer of land is driven by 
inheritance (Place and Otsuka, 2001). Indeed, detailed anthropological analysis indicates that 
³VHOOLQJODQGRXWRIOLQHDJH>LV@QRWTXLWHOHJLWLPDWH´%HUJHHWDOSSDQG³ERQDILGH
land holders are nRWDOORZHGWRUHQWRXWODQGDFFRUGLQJWRODZ´%HUJHHWDOSSTo 
capture the possibility that land ownership by male and female household members affect the 
decision of the household to opt for HV production, we include both the actual land sizes owned 
by male and female family members and their interaction with a dummy variable that indicates 
whether the household belongs to a matrilineal or a patrilineal kinship group. 
To verify whether there are any differences in welfare across kinship groups we include 
the dummy variable of matrilineal kinship in equation [2]. We do not have an unambiguous 
conceptual prior on the effect of kinship on welfare. On the one hand, there is evidence that 
patrilineal kinship may enhance household destitution due to abuse and welfare deteriorating 
male expenditure patterns in patrilineal societies (Benzer Kerr, 2005). At the same time, there 
is recent evidence that increasing competition over resources in matrilineal societies has direct 
negative implications on consumption and nutrition (Sear, 2008).  
3.Data 
 We estimate equations [1] and [2] using the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3) 
of Malawi, conducted between March 2010 and March 2011. It is a representative survey for 
the whole territory of the country, conducted by the National Statistical Office of Malawi 
ZKLFKUHFHLYHGWHFKQLFDOVXSSRUWIURPWKH:RUOG%DQNDVSDUWRIWKH:RUOG%DQN¶V
Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS). After accounting for missing observations and 
restricting the sample to those households who had access to land and derived income from 
agricultural production during the reference period, we are left with a sample of 7048 
observations.6 
 The survey is informationally rich. It permits us to identify the exogenously given 
institutional drivers of land ownership, namely, matrilineal and patrilineal societies. Matrilineal 
systems are characteristic of the Yao and Chewa ethnic groups, while patrilineal systems are 
associated with the Ngoni, Nkonde and Tumbuka ethnic groups. It is also possible to identify 
the total land size owned by each household member, as well as who in the household takes 
decisions over production and the use of income for each of the crops produced. As in any 
other LSMS survey, all remaining demographic and other characteristics that are part of our 
empirical specification, are available in the survey. Table 1A provides a description of all 
variables used in our empirical analysis. 
 As a start, we take a look at very rough cross tabulations on the relationship between 
land size and the probability of the household to be engaged in high value production (Figure 
1) and between the probability of high value production and living standard measures such as 
per adult equivalent consumption and poverty headcount (Figure 2). We see that aside from a 
small non-linearity in the land size-high value production relationship among the first two 
quintiles of the land distribution, exposure to high value production is positively related to 
larger land ownership. This is consistent with the theoretical model and empirical results of 
Dimova et al (2015). Furthermore, high value crop production is generally associated with 
better living standards.  
Basic descriptive statistics for the variables of interest to us (Table 1) further suggests that: 
x Men dominate ownership of land. While, on average, women own more land (0.88 acres) 
than men (0.85 acres), in Malawian matrilineal societies, the difference is negligible. In 
patrilineal societies, on the other hand, men (1.16 acres) own about 40 percent more land 
than women (0.70 acres).  
x Approximately 40% of households across both societies produce high value crops. 
However, significantly more income is generated from high value crop production in 
patrilineal compared to matrilineal societies. This is consistent with the possibility that 
increasingly insecure property rights in matrilineal societies affect negatively income 
generation from high value crops. %\ FRQWUDVW LQ NHHSLQJ ZLWK %HQ]HU .HUU¶V 
proposition, we observe that per adult equivalent consumption is on average higher in 
households belonging to matrilineal compared to patrilineal societies. However, given that 
matrilineal societies tend to be located in the Southern and Central part of Malawi, while 
patrilineal societies are located in the North, as a robustness check in our more rigorous 
empirical comparison of the incomes generated from high value production we control for 
regional fixed effects.  
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 2 highlights the results from our baseline treatreg analysis of the impact of 
exposure to HV agriculture on welfare, conditional on institutional determinants of HV 
exposure. The first two columns of the Table highlight the baseline results, while the second 
two columns highlight the results based on an expanded specification controlling for regional 
fixed effects. We see that the impact of the HV agricultural dummy on per adult equivalent 
expenditures is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which supports the prior 
based on our descriptive statistics and earlier literature. To interpret the estimate correctly, it is 
necessary to compute the impact of the HV variable net of the selectivity effect, which is given 
by the difference between the absolute values of the coefficients of the HV variable and the 
coefficients of the Mills ratios. The coefficients of these variables across the two different 
specifications are 0.33 and 0.22, while the absolute values of the corresponding Mills ratios are 
0.15 and 0.10. This indicates that in the baseline case, involvement in High Value agriculture 
leads to 18% increase in per adult equivalent expenditures of those involved vis-à-vis those not 
involved. Once we control for regional fixed effects, this percentage goes down to 12%.  
In keeping with figure 1, larger land size is positively associated with entry into HV 
agriculture, irrespective of whether it is in the hands of male or female land owners. The precise 
effect of male and female land ownership is difficult to interpret directly from the treatreg 
results and hence we estimated separately the first stage probit model and computed the 
corresponding marginal probability effects of land size on entry into High Value agriculture. 
The results (available upon request) indicate that 1% increase in land availability for either 
PDOHVRUIHPDOHVOHDGVWRDSSUR[LPDWHO\LQFUHDVHLQWKHKRXVHKROG¶VFKDQFHRIHQWU\LQWR
High Value agriculture.  At the same time, the interaction term between matrilineal kinship and 
male land ownership is positive and significant, indicating that larger male ownership in 
matrilineal societies stimulates entry into HV agriculture. In fact, the corresponding marginal 
effects indicate that there is approximately 50% increase in the chance of male land ownership 
in matrilineal societies to contribute to entry into HV agriculture compared to male land 
ownership in patrilineal societies. The interaction terms of matrilineal kinship and female land 
ownership are insignificant. This is consistent with the literature based arguments that in an 
environment where complementary resources and norms favour male as opposed to female 
involvement in more remunerative technologies or crops, female de facto land ownership and 
associated social norms in themselves are not a panacea to welfare deteriorating choices. The 
results are robust to the inclusion of regional fixed effects.   
Land ownership patterns appear to be the key drivers to entry into high value 
agriculture. The only other significant variable in the HV entry equation is higher education, 
which rather counter intuitively has negative impact on entry into HV agriculture.  
Looking at the non-HV agriculture based determinants of welfare, we see that in 
keeping with Karr (2005) matrilineal social norms have positive (as a corollary, patrilineal 
social norms have a negative) impact on welfare. As expected and in keeping with our priors, 
higher education is generally positively related to per adult equivalent expenditures, while 
female headship has negative impact on per adult equivalent expenditures. While young 
dependency ratios are negatively related to per adult equivalent expenditures, old dependency 
rations (proportion of household members above the age of 60) are positively associated with 
per adult equivalent expenditures. This is consistent with the possibility of greater contribution 
of older people to income generation and consequently consumption in the household than 
children. 
 While our main empirical focus so far was on the determinants and welfare implications 
of exposure to HV agriculture (compared to non-HV agricultural occupational choices), our 
descriptive statistics indicated that there may be some differences in the institutional 
determinants of the actual income generated from high value agriculture. Hence, as a further 
extension and robustness check, we estimate a version of the model that uses the proportion of 
income generated from high value agriculture as a substitute to the dummy variable of exposure 
to HV agriculture. Given that the treatreg model belongs to the family of instrumental variable 
models- and is more efficient than the standard 2SLS for a situation where the endogenous 
variable is binary- its continuous endogenous variable analogy is the standard 2SLS, which we 
estimate with the use of the ivreg command in Stata. As argued earlier, the literature on Malawi 
provides ample evidence to suggest that our land ownership variables for males and females 
are exogenous in the HV income generation equation. The standard tests available for the 2SLS 
model suggest that income generated from HV production is not exogenous in the per adult 
equivalent consumption equation. In addition, the specification passes the Sargan and Basmann 
tests for overidentified restrictions, granting some support to our choice of excluded 
instruments. 
These results, highlighted in Table 3, are broadly consistent with those based on 
exposure to HV agriculture. We see that the effect of the share of income generated from HV 
agriculture is strongly positively associated with welfare. To be precise, the corresponding 
marginal effects (available upon request) indicate that a 1% increase in the share of income 
generated from High Value agriculture leads to approximately 1% increase in welfare. As in 
the case of exposure to HV agriculture, the size of land per se, irrespective of whether it is in 
the hands of male or female owners has positive impact on HV agriculture income. However, 
in contrast to the results in Table 2, we observe that both the matrilineal dummy variable and 
the interaction term of matrilineal kinship and female ownership are negative and significant. 
The significance of the matrilineal dummy disappears after controlling for regional fixed effect, 
but the interaction terms continue to be negative and significant, in fact, its significance level 
increases. This indicates that female ownership in matrilineal societies has negative 
implications for the ability of the household to generate income through high value agriculture 
and grants further support to our earlier observation that female empowerment itself may not 
be a panacea for household welfare problems.  
 
Conclusion 
In the development literature and policy making, increasing per adult equivalent 
household expenditure and, correspondingly, poverty alleviation, is an end in itself. At the same 
time, there is strong advocacy in favour of increasing the incidence and extent of asset 
(primarily land) ownership of women, based on extant literature that highlights various 
beneficial influences of female ownership. These parallel discussions ignore that possibility 
that while asset ownership by women may be empowering, it may not produce the desired 
positive impact on household welfare in circumstances when women do not have adequate 
access to markets and complementary resources such as capital and hired labour. Alternatively, 
women may be less willing to take the risks associated with high-return use of these assets, or 
undertake necessary complementary investments, if their de facto property rights are weak. In 
such cases, even in contexts where social norms guarantee women ownership of assets (such 
as land), household per adult equivalent consumption (and hence welfare) may ironically be 
better served if men are de facto allowed to own (or control) significant amounts of these assets. 
We examine this proposition within the context of Malawi, where patrilineal and 
matrilineal societies co-exist in mutually exclusive geographical locations. Our results suggest 
that while household per adult equivalent consumption (and hence welfare) is enhanced by 
high value crop production, the likelihood of cultivating these crops in matrilineal societies 
increases with the amount of land owned by men in the households. Furthermore, the share of 
income generated through high value agriculture is negatively associated with the amount of 
female ownership of land by women in these societies. 
  In other words, there is at least weak evidence to suggest that de jure female ownership 
of assets may not be a panacea in developing economy contexts; household interests may be 
better served by male ownership of these assets, either because men in these contexts have 
better access to complementary resources that enable them to deploy the assets in ways that 
enhance returns to them, or because uncertainty about property rights induce women to take 
less risk or under-invest in these assets. 
 The policy implication is that female ownership of assets cannot be approached piece-
meal, and in order to make it consistent with the equally important objective(s) of enhancing 
household welfare (and poverty alleviation) a wider and holistic approach has to be adopted. 
Along with de jure ownership of assets (such as land), women need to be assured of their long 
term property rights. As the empirical evidence presented in this paper indicates, this may not 
always be the case and assurance of property rights may therefore involve the enactment and 
enforcement of formal laws which violate traditional institutions such as the social norms that 
ZRUNWRXQGHUPLQHZRPHQ¶VSURSHUW\ULJKWV0RUHRYHUZRPHQVKRXOGKDYHLPSURYHGDFFHVV
to complementary resources and other factors (such as capital and market access) that are 
required to generate significant returns on assets (such as land) over which they have ownership 
(or control). In other words, while women's ownership of assets may be a necessary condition 
for both female empowerment in developing countries and for enhanced household welfare, on 
its own ownership cannot guarantee either of these objectives. While this has been recognised 
in discussions about the interaction between ownership, institutions (including uncertainty 
about property rights) and access to resources in contexts where the units of assessment are 
firms, there are few evidence-based discussions in the context of households. This paper adds 
to that evidence-based discussion and thereby makes a significant contribution to the related 
yet somewhat parallel literatures about female ownership of assets and economic development 
(through household welfare). 
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Table 1 
 Full 
sample 
Matrilineal Patrilineal 
Land size controlled (acres) 
By male 0.91 
(1.53) 
0.85  
(1.53) 
1.16 
 (1.61) 
By female 0.88 
(1.24) 
0.88  
(1.24) 
0.70 
(1.24) 
High value crop production 
Household produces high value crops 0.41 
(0.49) 
0.40 
(0.49) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
Share of income generated from high value crops 0.14 
(0.47) 
0.11 
(0.25) 
0.29 
(0.98) 
Household per adult equivalent consumption 
All households 64388 
(68586) 
65608 
(72095) 
58495 
(47755) 
N of observations 7048 5839 1209 
Note: The figures in brackets are standard deviations. The differences in means across 
matrilineal and patrilineal were tested and are significant in all cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Baseline specification: Exposure to HV agricultural production and welfare 
 No regional fixed effects With regional fixed effects 
Constant 11.19 (0.04)*** -0.62 (0.11)*** 11.22 (0.06)*** -0.49 (0.11)*** 
Head age -0.007 (0.001)*** 0.002(0.001) -0.01 (0.001)*** 0.001 (0.002) 
Female head -0.07 (0.03)** 0.01 (0.06) -0.07 (0.03)** -0.004 (0.07) 
Monogamous -0.15 (0.03)*** 0.08 (0.06) -0.15 (0.03)*** 0.01 (0.07) 
Polygamous -0.18 (0.03)*** 0.12 (0.08) -0.17 (0.03)*** 0.06 (0.08) 
Proportion 6 -0.68 (0.04)*** 0.01 (0.08) -0.69 (0.04)*** -0.05 (0.10) 
Proportion 7-15 -0.77 (0.04)*** 0.05 (0.09) -0.77 (0.04)*** 0.03 (0.09) 
Proportion 60 0.20 (0.05)*** -0.02 (0.10) 0.20 (0.05)*** 0.003 (0.11) 
Primary 0.26 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.05) 0.26 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.05) 
Secondary 0.52 (0.02)*** 0.003 (0.05) 0.51 (0.02)*** 0.01 (0.05) 
Higher 1.36 (0.06)*** -0.47 (0.14)*** 1.33 (0.06)*** -0.51 (0.14)*** 
Matrilineal 0.13 (0.02)*** -0.04 (0.06) 0.06 (0.04) -0.04 (0.11) 
Female land size  0.12 (0.03)***  0.14 (0.03)*** 
Male land size  0.13 (0.02)***  0.12 (0.02)*** 
Female land 
size*matrilineal 
 -0.02 (0.03)  -0.03 (0.03) 
Male land 
size*matrilineal 
 0.08 (0.11)***  0.06 (0.03)** 
High value 
exposure 
0.33 (0.05)***  0.22 (0.07)***  
Dŝůů ?ƐZĂƚŝŽ -0.1529*** 
(0.0309) 
 -0.1007*** 
(0.0417) 
 
LR test of 
independent 
equations  
Chi2 (1)=4.55 
Prob>Chi2=0.0329 
Chi2 (1)=6.07 
Prob>Chi2=0.0138 
N of observations 7048 7048 
Note: The figures in brackets are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Table 3: Determinants of income share of HV agriculture and welfare consequences 
 No regional fixed effects With regional fixed effects 
Constant 11.16 (0.06)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 11.28 (0.06)*** -0.01 (0.03) 
Head age -0.01 (0.0007)*** -0.0002 (0.0003) -0.01 (0.0007)*** -0.0002 (0.0003) 
Female head -0.04 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) 
Monogamous -0.14 (0.03)*** 0.003 (0.02) -0.14 (0.03)*** -0.0004 (0.02) 
Polygamous -0.17 (0.04)*** 0.01 (0.02) -0.16 (0.03)*** -0.001 (0.02) 
Proportion 6 -0.65 (0.05)*** -0.02 (0.02) -0.67 (0.05)*** -0.03 (0.02) 
Proportion 7-15 -0.79 (0.05)*** 0.02 (0.02) -0.79 (0.04)*** 0.02 (0.02) 
Proportion 60 0.21 (0.05)*** -0.02 (0.02) 0.21 (0.05)*** -0.02 (0.02) 
Primary 0.22 (0.03)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.23 (0.03)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 
Secondary 0.51 (0.02)*** -0.001 (0.01) 0.52 (0.02)*** -0.003 (0.01) 
Higher 1.34 (0.06)*** -0.03 (0.03) 1.33 (0.06)*** -0.03 (0.03) 
Matrilineal 0.20 (0.03)*** -0.04 (0.01)*** 0.06 (0.05) 0.03 (0.02) 
Female land size  0.02 (0.01)***  0.03 (0.01)*** 
Male land size  0.03 (0.01)***  0.02 (0.006)*** 
Female land 
size*matrilineal 
 -0.02 (0.01)***  -0.03 (0.007)*** 
Male land 
size*matrilineal 
 -0.003 (0.01)  -0.004 (0.006) 
Income share of 
HV agriculture 
1.34 (0.03)***  0.85 (0.21)***  
Test of 
endogeneity  
H0: Share HV exogenous 
Durbin Chi2(1)=35.29 (p=0.0000) 
Wu-Hausman F (1,7034)=35.40 (p=0.000) 
H0: Share HV exogenous 
Durbin Chi2(1)=19.25 (p=0.0000) 
Wu-Hausman F (1,7032)=19.26 (p=0.000) 
Test of overid 
restrictions 
Sargan Chi2(3)=4.72 (p=0.1934) 
Basmann Chi2(3)=4.71 (p=0.1940) 
Sargan Chi2(3)=3.71 (p=0.2942) 
Basmann Chi2(3)=3.70 (p=0.2951) 
N of observations 7048 7048 
Note: The figures in brackets are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Figure 1: Incidence of High value production by land size quintile 
 
 
Figure 2: Welfare implications of High value production 
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Appendix 
Table 1A: Description of variables used 
Head age Age of the head of household 
Female head Dummy=1 if the head of household is 
female 
Monogamous Dummy= 1 if the head of household is in a 
monogamous union 
Polygamous Dummy= 1 if the head of household is in a 
polygamous union 
Proportion 6 Proportion of family members of age 6 or 
lower 
Proportion 7-15 Proportion of family members between ages 
7 and 15 
Proportion 60 Proportion of family members of age 60 or 
higher 
Primary Dummy=1 if the head of household has 
primary education 
Secondary Dummy=1 if the head of household has 
secondary education 
Higher Dummy=1 if the head of household has 
tertiary education 
Matrilineal Dummy=1 if the household belongs to a 
matrilineal kinship group 
Female land size Total land size in acres owned by female 
family members 
Male land size Total land size in acres owned by male 
family members 
Income share of HV agriculture The share of HV agriculture income in total 
household income 
HV exposure Dummy=1 if the household produces any 
high value crops 
 
1
 Note that agricultural commercialisation is typically associated with greater agricultural 
productivity and the focus of much of the related literature performs productivity estimates. By 
contrast, our main interest is not on productivity assessment, but on the link between 
LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWKHKRXVHKROG¶VH[SRVXUHWRKLJKYDOXHFURSSURGXFWLRQRQWKHRQHKDQGDQG
between high value crop production and household welfare, on the other hand. In what follows, 
we use HV crop production as a proxy for exportable commercial crops - tobacco and 
groundnuts - in Malawi (see also footnote 4). This distinguishes our case for instance from a 
situation of commercialisation in the form of enhanced productivity of food crops like rice by 
way, for instance, of enhancing smDOOKROGHUV¶DFFHVVWRLUULJDWLRQ 
2
 In the patrilineal land tenure system, typically found in the Northern parts of the country 
among the Ngoni, Ngonde and Tumbuka ethnic groups, sons inherit land directly from their 
fathers and women can only gain user rights to land through their husbands. Virilocal residence 
WKDWLVKDYLQJWKHPDQ¶VYLOODJHDVWKHPDWULPRQLDOKRPHLVFXVWRPDU\IRUSDWULOLQHDONLQVKLS
systems and the man pays lobola RUEULGHSULFHWRWKHZLIH¶VSDUHQWVWRHVWDEOLVKKLVULJKWWR
take is wife and children to his own village. By contrast, in the matrilineal land tenure system, 
characterising the Yao and Chewa ethnic groups, residing predominantly in the Southern and 
Central parts of the country, women have the primary rights to land through their lineage. 
Husbands can seek land from the village headman or their in-laws, but do not automatically 
UHWDLQULJKWV WRZLIH¶V ODQG LQ WKHHYHQWRIGLYRUFHRUIHPDOH ODQGRZQHU¶VGHDWK *UHHQDQG
Baden, 1994). 
3
 Note that we do not consider intra-household bargaining. We are only interested in the effect 
of institutions on the exposure of the household to high value agriculture, while welfare is a 
household level outcome of this exposure and is proxied as an average across household 
members. 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 In the early post-independence years the country followed the typical sub-Saharan policies of 
heavy government involvement and stimulation of cash crops (predominantly tobacco) at the 
expense of food crops. Agriculture was subdivided into two sectors, roughly contributing to 70 
percent and 30 percent of the agricultural GDP, respectively: (i) smallholder sector made up 
predominantly of maize producing farmers, the majority surviving at the bare subsistence level  
(Devereux, 1999; Whiteside, 2000), and (ii) cash crop (mainly tobacco dominated) sector with 
production concentrated in estates. As in other sub-Saharan African countries, the dramatic 
change in terms of trade during the late 1970s (together with external shocks like the war in 
Mozambique and a severe draught in the early 1980s) paved the way for IMF and World Bank 
led adjustment programs, including, among others, active encouragement of smallholder 
involvement in the production of exportable cash crops such as tobacco and groundnuts and 
adoption of higher value hybrid maize varieties. Although the adjustment policies were subject 
to multiple stop-and-go experiences, mainly on account of renewed food crises and changes in 
political ideology, the change in regime did result in an increased production of higher value 
crops, especially hybrid maize by smallholders (Harrigan, 2003). 
5
 We thought of theoretical conceptualisations that would give more (institutional) meaning to 
these variables. However, polygamy does not appear to be widespread in Malawi; less than 
10% of the unions in our sample are polygamous. Hence, no interactions that we attempted 
turned out to be significant. We therefore treat both indicators of marriage simply as controls 
in our empirical specifications. 
6
 To arrive at this sample size we further restrict to households that are clearly either 
³PDWULOLQHDO´RUSDWULOLQHDO´DVH[SODLQHGLQWKHQH[WSDUDJUDSK:HEDVHDOOWKHDQDO\VLVRQWKLV
sample of 7048 observations. 
